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The Duty to Recontact: Benefit and Harm
To The Editor:
The survey by Fitzpatrick et al. (1999), “The Duty to
Recontact: Attitudes of Genetics Services Providers,”
represents a significant contribution to, and an impor-
tant step forward in, the resolution of a complex and
troubling issue. But, in both their Introduction and their
Discussion, the authors refer to statements of mine
(Sharpe 1994b) that have been taken out of context and
therefore misrepresent my position on this issue. More
critically, Fitzpatrick et al. have failed to take note of
medical principles and legal obligations that are fun-
damental to discussion about whether a duty to recon-
tact exists within the context of medical genetics and
genetic counseling.
For example, the authors wrote that I stated “a phy-
sician’s duty of care toward patients is considered to
include the obligation to advise them of any develop-
ments in management and treatment that would be ben-
eficial or detrimental” (Sharpe 1994b). This statement,
in the context in which it is presented, is incorrect. My
article (Sharpe 1994b) focused on the psychological as-
pects of presymptomatic testing for Huntington disease
and, in particular, on whether a geneticist would have
a continuing obligation to provide psychological support
after disclosure of the test results. This issue was ex-
amined within the context of a physician’s traditional
postoperative duties of care to a patient, including the
duties to monitor a patient’s condition, to provide ap-
propriate aftercare, to refer, and not to abandon the
patient. As cited in my article, such obligations have long
been recognized in the various codes and principles of
ethics of organizations such as the American Medical
Association and the Canadian Medical Association.
With respect to Huntington disease, because of the
potential for and the nature of the psychological and
psychiatric responses associated with risk clarification
or a clinical diagnosis, I suggested that, in the sameman-
ner in which a physician may have a duty to continue
treatment until recovery is complete, a geneticist may
have a continuing duty of care until appropriate psy-
chological or psychiatric counseling has been arranged.
Once such counseling has been secured, however, the
geneticist’s obligation would come to an end.
In the same article, with respect to phenylketonuria,
I also speculated—as evidenced by my explicit use of the
term “theoretically”—that, because of the necessity of
maintaining a low-phenylalanine diet and the fact that
the gene technically has been expressed, a geneticist
might have a duty to monitor a patient’s condition over
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a prolonged period of time (assuming that an appro-
priate referral could not be arranged).
Both of these clinical scenarios concern situations in
which the patient may require immediate and continuing
treatment and management. Strictly within this context,
I wrote, “This duty to monitor may include the obli-
gation to advise of any developments in management
and treatment that would prove of benefit or detriment
to the patient” (Sharpe 1994b). At no time did I suggest
that either of these scenarios were examples of, or would
support the concept of, a duty to recontact former pa-
tients. Indeed, the duty to recontact was nevermentioned
in my article.
With respect to a physician’s continuing duty of care,
as cited (Sharpe 1994b), American and Canadian courts
of law have created a number of distinct categories in
which to interpret a physician’s duty to monitor, to refer,
not to abandon, and to provide appropriate care. Gen-
erally speaking, these categories include: (1) advising a
patient of the nature of her or his medical status; (2)
providing a proper follow-up, which may include an
obligation to instruct a patient about all appropriate
precautions that must be carried out subsequent to treat-
ment and/or an obligation to carry out regular medical
examinations to monitor the patient’s medical condition;
and (3) a continuing duty of care, recognized by a num-
ber of American jurisdictions, when a risk of future in-
jury arises from the original patient-physician relation-
ship (Tresemer v. Barke 1978).
What these categories have in common, however, is
the fundamental medical issue—not cited by Fitzpatrick
et al.—of whether a patient is in continued need of a
physician’s expert care (Sharpe 1994b). In the past, the
term “expert care” has been resolved within the tradi-
tional context of treatment and cure. In phenylketonuria
and Huntington disease, because a patient may require
immediate treatment and management, the geneticist or
physician arguably will have a continuing obligation to
provide such expert care until an appropriate referral
has been arranged.
These particular examples, however, do not a general
rule make. And they are substantially different from the
concept, incorrectly attributed to me (among others) by
Fitzpatrick et al. (1999), that a geneticist or physician
may have a continuing obligation “to recontact former
patients about advances in research.”
The duty to recontact described by Fitzpatrick et al.
is not necessarily concerned with the existing medical
and legal issues of whether continuing expert treatment
is required. Rather, this duty represents a new “ethical”
or “moral” obligation (Fitzpatrick et al. 1999) to contact
patients, years after an original test was completed, in
order to inform them that a new or more accurate di-
agnostic or risk-clarification genetic test is available.
Medical genetics and genetic counseling represent a
therapeutic model of care analogous to, but distinct
from, the practice of medicine. For many genetic dis-
eases, treatment and cure are not available. Predictive
genetic testing, for example, is concerned primarily with
providing information about a medical condition that is
likely to occur at some time in the future. Because of
such limitations, the medical genetics and genetic-coun-
seling communities have recognized that if physicians
are to provide benefit and to prevent harm to the patient
before, during, and after genetic testing, physicians will
have to develop a more “human vision” of care, focusing
on the patient’s informational, communicative, emo-
tional, and psychological needs (National Society of Ge-
netic Counselors 1997), as opposed to a purely “medical
vision” restricted to the treatment and cure of physical
disease.
It must be acknowledged that the proposed duty to
recontact embodies this “human vision” by advancing
the principle that the clinical interpretation of “contin-
uing expert care” can no longer be restricted to the med-
ical treatment of disease but must be expanded to include
a patient’s informational needs. However, other equally
compelling values and practical considerations must be
taken into account.
First, if there is a lack of appropriate resources and
qualified personnel, one must inquire how a geneticist
or physician can reasonably and practically fulfill such
a duty to recontact. This question seems especially ap-
propriate, given that the recognition of this duty could
represent a new, potentially inequitable, and onerous
cause of action for medical negligence. Although a num-
ber of the suggestions proposed by Fitzpatrick et al.
(1999), such as the use of Internet sites, appear to be
very reasonable solutions, arguments have been voiced
that a geneticist, at the risk of exposure to liability, has
an obligation to ensure that not only the quality of the
information, but also the manner of communication
(e.g., language and terminology, taking into account cul-
tural and socioeconomic differences) and the method of
communication (e.g., telephone call or letter) (Sharpe
1994a; National Society of Genetic Counselors 1997)
are reasonably appropriate to a patient’s needs. Discus-
sion and debate continue, for example, about how to
effectively communicate health information on the In-
ternet (Jadad and Gagliardi 1998; Kim et al. 1999).
Second, the fundamental objective and underlying ra-
tionale for the duty to recontact is that it will provide
benefit and prevent harm. But is this operative assump-
tion valid? What if recontacting a patient provokes ad-
verse emotional and psychological responses? (Almqvist
et al. 1997; Fitzpatrick et al. 1999). Aside from the fact
that such responses could affect a patient’s ability to
appropriately understand the nature and implications of
the new information (Sharpe 1994b), what of the impact
on the patient and the family? Will the geneticist or the
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physician have an obligation, and the required resources,
“to provide appropriate psychological support” (Cana-
dian College of Medical Geneticists 1997), “to help fam-
ilies and individuals recognize and cope with their emo-
tional and psychological needs,” and to “recognize sit-
uations that require psychiatric referral” (American
Board of Medical Genetics 1997)? If the proposed duty
to recontact is to become part of a geneticist’s or a phy-
sician’s duty of care toward a patient, it cannot operate
independently of her or his other duties.
Third, the medical-genetics and genetic-counseling
communities recognize that good patient care requires
an individualized, patient-by-patient approach. Genetic
diseases such as phenylketonuria, Huntington disease,
cystic fibrosis, and neurofibromatosis represent distinct
clinical problems and outcomes, with equally distinct
patient needs on a short-term as well as on a long-term
basis. One patient’s response to a presymptomatic test
result—or to the news of a new diagnostic or risk-clar-
ification test—can be substantially different from an-
other’s. How is the duty to recontact to be applied prac-
tically, first for each of these diseases, and second on a
patient-by-patient basis, given the prevailing value of
nondirective counseling?More importantly, howwill the
duty to recontact be reconciled with a patient’s funda-
mental right of autonomous decision making, including
the right not to know (Ost D 1984; Yarborough et al.
1989; De Wert G 1992)? Will notes made at the end of
a clinical record (Fitzpatrick et al. 1999) be sufficient to
protect a patient’s autonomy and values?
Given these concerns and risks, what practical benefit
is to be gained by adding the duty to recontact to the
already existing obligations to monitor, to provide ap-
propriate aftercare, to refer, and not to abandon?Would
it not be preferable—and more realistic—to resolve this
issue, on a patient-by-patient basis, within the existing
framework of these medical and legal obligations, es-
pecially with regard to the obligations of the geneticist
or physician?
If the consensus, however, is to recognize some form
of a duty to recontact, or at least an obligation to provide
information to former patients, a solution may be found
by returning to the underlying principles of the genetic-
counseling therapeutic model of care. For nearly 25 years
(Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Counseling 1975), a
fundamental objective of the genetic-counseling process
has been to help patients to make the best possible ad-
justment, and to choose a course of action which seems
most appropriate to them given their goals and ethical
and religious standards. These principles recognize that
the patient will play an integral role in the therapeutic
process.
The patient, therefore, will have to accept a reasonable
degree of responsibility, including the obligations to pro-
vide appropriate information (e.g., her or his family’s
medical history); to make a reasonable effort to under-
stand the nature and implications of genetic information;
and to describe his or her particular concerns, needs,
expectations, and values. There appears to be no good
reason why this long-standing concept of responsibility
shared by the patient and the geneticist or physician
should not equally apply to the duty to recontact.
The responsibility of the geneticist or physician, there-
fore, will be to discuss this issue with each patient, to
receive instructions, and to keep reasonably up-to-date
with all significant—and proven—research advances.
The patient will have a corresponding obligation to
contact the geneticist or the physician on a regular bas-
is, such as once per year, for updates, and to request
an appointment for clarification or for counseling, if
required.
But, again, is this type of responsibility realistic and
practically attainable, given the resources available to a
geneticist or to a physician, especially with regard to
qualified personnel? When one speaks of ethical values
and moral obligations, one does not necessarily speak
of absolute standards. One speaks of a choice among
possible alternatives, with the knowledge that none of
the available options may prove harmless. In a circum-
stance in which either course of action would appear to
offer both benefit and harm, which course is to be given
priority, and by whom?
Advocates of the duty to recontact argue that it should
be recognized as a standard of care, because it exem-
plifies medicine’s traditional values and objectives by
providing the best opportunity for therapeutic benefit
and the prevention of medical harm. This duty, however,
has been given a higher priority despite the facts that
(1) a former patient could suffer harm in the form of
adverse psychological responses; (2) the geneticist or the
physician could incur harm in the form of an inequitable
and unreasonable exposure to legal liability for medical
negligence; and (3) the duty may prove practically dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to fulfill. It is reasonable, there-
fore, to ask why the duty to recontact has been given
priority, why its values have been deemed more valid,
and who made this decision.
In 1994, I examined how a court of law would be
likely to interpret professional accreditation standards
and human/medical genetics literature with respect to a
geneticist’s duty of care for communication, informed
consent, and psychological counseling for presympto-
matic testing for Huntington disease (Sharpe 1994a,
1994b). My intent was to alert the medical-genetics and
genetic-counseling communities to the implications that
such standards of care could pose in terms of a physi-
cian’s practical ability to provide such care in clinical-
or primary-care service, as well as the potential expan-
sion in causes of action for medical negligence.
The conclusion, which applies equally to this discus-
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sion, stated that “the standard of care identified in this
article has not been imposed by a court of law. It is the
standard of care developed by geneticists and physicians.
Debate as to its ‘reasonableness’ will have to be resolved
by the medical genetics community” (Sharpe 1994a).
NEIL F. SHARPE
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Reply to Sharpe
To the Editor:
Mr. Sharpe correctly notes that in our article (Fitzpatrick
et al. 1999) he was credited for considering the existence
of a physician’s duty of care toward patients (Sharpe
1994). His comments in this regard were indeed made
in the context of Huntington disease, but, as we did not
attribute to him any opinion on the duty to recontact,
his position on this subject was not misrepresented, but
simply omitted, from our discussion. We apologize to
Mr. Sharpe and thank him for clarifying his position.
The intention of our article was to report and discuss
original research findings and not to present a detailed
analysis of medical principles and legal obligations as-
sociated with a theoretical duty to recontact. It was our
hope that our article would stimulate such a discourse,
and we thank Mr. Sharpe for his insightful comments.
JENNIFER L. FITZPATRICK AND MARLENE J. HUGGINS
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology
Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation
Hamilton, Ontario
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The Choice to Have a Disabled Child
To the Editor:
What are the purposes of genetic testing, what are the
principles guiding its use, and who should decide what
tests should be available for what purposes? These fa-
miliar questions are raised in an unfamiliar context by
a study reported recently in this journal (Middleton et
al. 1998). Attitudes toward genetic testing were assessed
among deaf people attending a conference in the United
